This is a response to an article by Ryan Hass in Foreign Affairs titled “China Is Not Ten Feet Tall.” It is a well-written piece that draws a conclusion I largely agree with, but there are still caveats that should be addressed in order to garner a succinct understanding of why America’s China policy has moved in the direction it has, and why it will likely continue moving in that direction.

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Hass makes the argument that Washington should not substitute strengthening advancements at home with a blind focus on countering Beijing at every step. This is a fine perspective to hold, yet he goes on to indirectly admonish those who do hold China as a powerful threat. There are some lapses in this assessment that unfortunately take away from his ultimate point, as it is important to recognize that policymakers on both sides of the aisle have been sounding the alarm on China more frequently because of several key reasons:

• China’s rise in the ’00s was almost overlooked as the War on Terror overshadowed it, along with there being beliefs of China’s eventual democratization or the eventual collapse of its growth before it could become a great power. Neither happened. This led to a reactive swing in the other direction in recent years, as many have realized that they may have de-prioritized China for far too long.

• The scare of a strong China is helpful for American growth. This goes beyond injecting new funds into the military-industrial complex (which certainly appreciates the demand caused by a peer technological competitor). Quite simply, the goal of sounding the alarm on China is to ‘wake’ America up to foster its strengths. Hass gets close to this in the conclusion, but something that needs to be considered is that jump-starting this is a arduous task without the proper stimuli. At a time where many Americans believe their country to be fractured and diminished (even if only temporarily), the unifying effect of an outside threat is difficult to match.

• • There are absolute downsides to this, namely the perception of threats within the America’s borders and the uncoincidental skyrocketing of hate against Asian Americans. Yet as fear and insecurity are that much more effective than relying on innate self-confidence, this will be an inevitable presence for years to come.

• A China that is not as strong as it says is still a reasonable threat, and a China that begins to decline is an extremely dangerous threat. The disruptive capabilities of another weaker power with demographic anxieties have evidenced with Putin’s Russia, and if Xi’s China truly begins to falter down the line, there would be every cause for concern that it could disrupt regional and even global stability. A future China that faces food insecurity, demographic crises, climate catastrophes, and economic turmoil would still be a nuclear-armed nationalistic state in possession of hypersonic technologies and comparative strengths at sea and in space.

I would agree that China is still decades away from being able to challenge the US on a global scale (debates remain as to whether Beijing truly even wants to), and that America should first resuscitate and reinforce itself. However, that is difficult to come by without a unifying threat.

It may sound cynical, but this is the rationale behind painting China as a Goliath — it is perhaps the most effective way to stimulate long-term American strategic thinking.

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Hass touches on several challenges that China will face, but he seems to miss the equally threatening disruption of automation to its labor force and the inevitable perils of climate change. Of the ones that he does mention, the challenge that holds the most lasting effect is the issue of China’s demographics.

Chinese demographics is a fascinatingly tricky issue worthy of deeper exploration, and I aim to take a shot at it in a future post.